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At the level of tax design, the answer to this question 
is clear and positive. It would be easy, for example, 
to draft the international treaty and the national 
legislation required to implement Thomas Piketty’s 
(2014) proposal for a global tax on wealth. The 
obstacles to acceptance and implementation of 
those proposals are merely political – but at the same 
time they are formidable. There has been a steady, 
worldwide movement away from wealth taxes of any 
kind in recent decades, and the many previous calls 
for international cooperation to establish some kind 
of global tax have failed (Bird, 2015). Political realism 
suggests that we start somewhere else.
There is one slightly more promising launch pad: 
the considerable progress that has been made very 
recently in establishing a system for the automatic 
exchange of financial account information in tax 
matters (see OECD, n.d.). This sounds very technical. 
The system essentially increases and eases the flow 
of information to national tax authorities about the 
financial assets held by individuals and companies in 
other jurisdictions. China could discover, for example, 
what bank accounts its citizens hold in Portugal. 
This initiative is not transformative. Having access 
to more information is one thing, and having the 
resources and political incentives to make use of it 
to plug tax gaps is another. Many governments are 
unenthusiastic about taxing their rich friends, and 
there are still many legal devices to keep secret or 
obscure the real ownership of assets. At present, 
the information flows relate only to financial assets, 
not to real estate, gold bars, jewellery or Picassos. 
Few developing countries have yet qualified to 
join the system. Nevertheless, in the long term 
automatic information exchange provides a basis 
for the more effective taxation of rich people.
But what about companies, especially larger, 
transnational corporations? They are well placed to 
avoid taxes through more or less legal devices. One 
of the main techniques used is transfer mispricing. 
When companies within the same transnational 
group trade with one another across international 
borders, they may not account for these transactions 
at the ‘real’ market price for the goods and services 
involved. Instead, they may try to choose prices that 
are designed to shift group accounting profits to low-
tax or no-tax locations. Transfer pricing is now illegal 
in most countries. However, it remains widespread, 
because it is very hard to police. It is a cause of 
significant tax losses, especially to governments of 
low-income countries. 
It is easy to design changes to international tax rules 
that would reduce these losses. The obstacles to 
doing so are political. The resistance comes mainly 
from the rich countries. Some of the most significant 
tax haven activities are located in rich countries, 
rather than in small tropical islands. The OECD, acting 
under a mandate from the G20, has just spent two 
years trying to agree reforms to narrow the scope for 
legal tax avoidance by transnationals. The agreement, 
announced in October 2015, is rather modest in scope 
(see OECD, 2016).
Any positive, direct impact of the OECD’s proposed 
measures will be more on government finances than 
on the distribution of income. In most countries, a 
strategy to reduce income inequality should put as 
much emphasis on effective taxation of the local 
rich as on reducing tax evasion and avoidance by 
companies. In many poor countries, little attention has 
yet been paid to taxing the personal incomes of the 
growing ranks of the rich and mega-rich.
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So the answer to the opening question is that any 
changes to the international system that currently 
seem politically feasible are likely to contribute 
only marginally to reducing inequality. They could, 
however, be very helpful to national governments 
that are serious about the issue. When will they 
get serious? A good winning combination is a 
government that is really hungry for more revenue 
and a political movement that is well informed about 
the inequities of existing patterns of revenue raising.
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